Do firms learn from other firms' human resource allocation decisions? This paper studies this question in the context of worker promotions, which according to theory serve as informative signals to external employers under asymmetric learning about employee ability. Using variation in the timing of promotion reports on LinkedIn CVs, we implement a differences-in-differences strategy to demonstrate that online promotion reports increase recruiter-initiated worker contacts ("InMails"). The signaling impact of promotions is concentrated among those who have recently attracted previous recruiter interest; this effect is subsumed by firm and job heterogeneity, suggesting that factors idiosyncratic to individual users are less important relative to firm and job quality in providing labor market visibility.
Introduction
Labor markets are pervaded by informational frictions: the underlying job-relevant characteristics of workers are often unclear to employers. For example, the literature has recognized that education may be valuable in a signaling role, both theoretically (Spence (1973) and Arrow (1973) ) and empirically (for example, Tyler et al. (2000) ). In a similar vein, the literature has recognized a labor market signaling role for promotions, as in the theoretical contribution of Waldman (1984) .
This paper provides an empirical test of this hypothesis, demonstrating that recruiting employers update their beliefs on worker ability based on the promotion decisions of other employers.
The challenge to directly testing theories of informational dynamics in labor markets stems from a lack of precise microdata on information flow and worker-firm matching. In this paper, we leverage novel data from LinkedIn, a major online recruiting service, to study employer learning.
LinkedIn is an attractive empirical setting for two reasons. First, we are able to observe the flow of information about workers using data on the timing and nature of profile updates. Second, in this setting we can measure recruiter interest in workers longitudinally by using the count of "InMails" received per month by a user through the LinkedIn platform. InMails are messages sent from recruiters to LinkedIn users for the purpose of soliciting user interest in job opportunities. 1 InMails are economically interesting because they are likely to be an informative measure of the market perception of worker productivity. Recruiters pay to acquire the right to start a fixed amount of such correspondences with users, and anecdotally must spend nontrivial amounts of time to follow up with replies (often through a phone call).
Drawing on this novel empirical setting, our paper provides a direct test of the Waldman (1984) theory which predicts that, under asymmetric employer learning, promotions are informative signals to recruiters about worker ability. That is, the null hypothesis allows information on workers to be incomplete, but crucially stipulates that all employers have access to the same information set.
Under such conditions, promotions are not informative signals. In contrast, if employers have more information on workers within firm boundaries than external firms, promotions are informative signals of high worker ability. To study this effect, our empirical strategy begins by examining the trend in InMails to users who immediately report a promotion on LinkedIn. As a counterfactual, we consider the group of users who are also promoted, but delay reporting this event on their LinkedIn CV. This differences-in-differences approach allows us to estimate the average effect of a promotion report on recruiter interest in the time window before the counterfactual group reports their promotion. In particular, this approach differences out trends in recruiter interest driven by the changes in human capital that might occur around promotions.
We find robust evidence that online promotion reports on average drive significant increases in the perceived labor market value of employees. To get a sense of magnitudes, the average signaling effect of adding a promotion in our tightest baseline specification is 0.20 times the mean and 0.079 times the standard deviation of the individual-event-month 2 distribution of InMails received. This effect is 2 times the within company gender gap in average InMails received, and 0.65 times the within company college gap. This result does not appear to be explained mechanically through an immediacy effect via the LinkedIn search ranking algorithm, as we will discuss. 3 Rather, we interpret the results as evidence of asymmetric information between employers about workers.
We then explore the heterogeneity of the signaling value of promotions by prior recruiter interest. We find that the signaling impact of promotions is concentrated among workers who have recently attracted recruiter interest. This is consistent with an interpretation in which attributes idiosyncratic to individual users (such as links to personal websites with portfolios, or physical appearance) provide visibility or added weight to promotions. However, the data cut against such an interpretation as this effect is fully explained away by firm and job fixed effects. This suggests that firm and job attributes are relatively more important than idiosyncratic worker qualities in providing visibility on the job market.
Our sample is not representative of the general U.S. labor force. The sample on average is much more educated than the average U.S. worker, and are likely to hold relatively high-paying jobs. Thus, the results are not broadly generalizable; they rather hold in our particular context, which we describe in more detail in later sections.
2 That is, the unit of observation in our underlying dataset is a user-promotion-month. 3 See Section 2b for a discussion of the Recruiter Search Algorithm.
Related Work
Our estimation of the the signaling value of promotions has its roots in the canonical theory of internal labor markets; specifically, we provide the most direct test to date of the seminal Waldman (1984) theory which predicts that in a world of asymmetric employer learning, promotions are informative signals to recruiters. Importantly, symmetric employer learning is inconsistent with such an effect; in such a world by the time of a promotion other employers would already have fully updated their beliefs on a candidate. 4 Waldman (2013) provides a comprehensive review of the long empirical literature following Waldman (1984) . Schönberg (2007) uses data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), including participants' scores on the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT) and their subsequent work and compensation history. DeVaro and Waldman (2012) examines the role of promotions as signal of worker ability using personnel data from a single, medium-sized financial services company. More recently, Kahn (2013) explores asymmetric employer learning in the NLSY by focusing on the variance of wage changes, finding that asymmetric learning prevails in labor markets. Relative to this literature, the contribution of this paper is to provide a compelling reduced-form empirical test of the existence of asymmetric learning in the labor market through a direct estimation of the signaling value of promotions. Most papers in the literature must make structural assumptions to infer conclusions on labor market information structure from outcomes such as wage changes or firm to firm movements; our setting is advantageous in this regard because we directly observe recruiter interest in workers at high frequency, enabling a more direct empirical approach. This paper also fits into the massive literature studying the signaling value of various worker traits. Our empirical strategy is similar mechanically to the long tradition of resume audit studies, such as the seminal paper by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) on racial differences and more recent contributions such as Deming et al. (2016) on educational credentials from for-profit colleges, for example. Like these papers, our causal estimation relies on identifying variation across worker CVs and studies as its outcome variable employer contacts. We differ in that we consider longitudinal variation in a sample of resumes of real job market participants, and focus on promotions.
A large literature studies the dynamics of employer learning about employees and implications 4 See Harris and Holmstrom (1982) for an early paper drawing out the implications of symmetric employer learning.
for economic outcomes. 5 Many papers in this literature, such as Farber and Gibbons (1996) , assume that all employers in a market have access to the same information on employees. Other authors explore the implications of asymmetric learning about workers in both theoretical and empirical settings. Pinkston (2009) and Kahn and Lange (2014) explore rich theoretical frameworks and explore the relationship of asymmetric learning and wages. In Gibbons and Katz (1991) , asymmetric information about workers leads to a scarring effect of unemployment. Bernhardt and Zábojník (2001) show that if promotions are signals, employee retention motivates large wage increases for winning promotion tournaments. Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) advance a theory in which asymmetric learning about employees motivates firms to provide training. This paper also contributes to the literature on the way that worker-firm matching takes place online. Autor (2001), Stevenson (2009), and Nakamura et al. (2009) notably discuss this topic. Kuhn and Skuterud (2004) and Kuhn and Mansour (2014) use data from the CPS and NLSY find mixed results on the efficacy of worker online job search; our paper complements these in that it studies the worker search activities of employers through recruiters. The results in our paper provide evidence of the role of online job platforms in information diffusion. While it is intuitive and often asserted that online job platforms facilitate information flow in labor markets (as in Autor (2009) , it is difficult to pin this effect down empirically. This paper aims to shed light on this dimension of the plumbing of modern labor markets in addition to documenting cross sectional variation in labor market opacity.
There is also a growing literature which studies contract markets for online labor. See Agrawal et al. (2012) , Agrawal et al. (2013) , Ghani et al. (2014) , Thomas (2015a), and Thomas (2015b) . Pallais (2014) conducts an RCT on oDesk in which she shows that hiring and reviewing workers in detail leads to improved future career outcomes, and argues that this operates through an informational effect. This paper is complementary to this literature: the LinkedIn setting is primarily aimed toward recruiters targeting professionals for more traditional employment arrangements. Kuhn and Shen (2013) and Marinescu and Wolthoff (2015) also study online job platform settings.
Institutional Setting
The data in this paper are from LinkedIn, a leading online job and employment platform for workers, recruiters, and employers. LinkedIn maintains a publicly accessible online website containing userreported information on past working experience and education, as well as other features such as endorsements from and connections with other users. From its position as a live depository of labor market information, LinkedIn offers firms various products that help identify and recruit prospective employees. Indeed, the Recruiter tool accounts for around 60 percent of LinkedIn's total US net revenue and is the focus of this paper. 
2.a. InMails
Here we describe in detail the interactions between recruiters and LinkedIn users. The dependent variable of interest in this paper is InMails received per month by a LinkedIn user. 6
Recruiters (either directly employed by a hiring firm, or indirectly employed through a dedicated agency) pay for the ability to use the platform to send messages ("InMails") to users about new employment opportunities. InMails are messages sent from recruiters to LinkedIn users, usually for the purpose of soliciting user interest in a job opportunity. These messages are accessible through LinkedIn online or mobile platforms, but also are (by default) sent to the user's e-mail account associated with their LinkedIn profile.
InMails are likely to be a meaningful indicator of recruiter information and preferences because recruiters pay to acquire the right to start a fixed amount of such correspondences with users, and anecdotally must spend their limited time to follow up with replies (often through a phone call). Further, because InMails are costly, recruiters are incentivized to economize on their InMail usage in the same fashion any employee using resources costly to their employer is. We specifically measure the count of threads of messages directed towards a user initiated by a recruiter. That 6 For privacy purposes, in this paper we do not use the raw InMail series but rather the raw data series scaled by sample standard deviation (which we omit). In all following discussion we will omit this technicality with an understanding that the interpretation of any magnitude is in terms of the sample standard deviation. At no point in this research was any InMail text, subject lines, response rates, or other information used above and beyond counts received.
is, we measure new contacts between recruiters and workers. This data series provides a novel historical measure of employer perceptions on worker productivity.
Importantly, the messages we measure are separate from messages from a user's "connections" on LinkedIn, which are not paid for and often are not for the purpose of soliciting interest in new employment. In addition, while a user's connections may see updates about their connection (such as the addition of a new job) on their home screen, recruiters are not shown such information. 7
While we cannot rule out that an individual's "connections" (users who are connected to the individual) forward information to recruiters about new promotion postings, we do not find this to be of major concern. First, the recruiting divisions of companies are usually separate from other divisions which are more likely to contain the connections of LinkedIn users: recruiters often physically sit together. Secondly, if such a channel were operative, we note it is likely that a user's connections would have private information on promotions and would inform recruiters of such information on the date of the promotions, as opposed to on the date of the LinkedIn posting.
Recruiting using LinkedIn is anecdotally a long-term process: many recruiters follow potential candidates over time instead of haphazardly searching and messaging, especially in occupations such as software engineering or accounting in which there is high turnover at the individual contributor level.
We emphasize that active recruiter interest is an important determinant of worker welfare.
Recruiter contacts certainly improve worker welfare when they lead to new jobs. However, even in the absence of a job change, InMails provide the worker insurance against future unemployment in the event of an adverse firm shock. Further, Recruiter InMails give the worker added leverage during negotiations for wage increases or internal promotion. A more rigorous treatment of this topic is beyond the scope of this paper and is therefore left to future work.
2.b. Recruiter Search Algorithm
In this section we describe the search algorithm used by recruiters to find candidates of interest.
See these Lad and Kanduri (2014) and Sorokina (2013) for a more in depth discussion version of the following.
Consider a recruiter who enters the search query "Software Engineer Google New York", which would return LinkedIn users determined to be relevant to this search query. First, the algorithm spellchecks the search query. Second, the search algorithm parses the query and uses terms from the query to match to information from user profiles. To rank profiles which otherwise are equally relevant after this procedure, LinkedIn employs a procedure based on the "FastPairs" algorithm to rank search relevance based on past profile clicks in search queries, adjusting for position bias (that is, the search ranking of the profile in past activity). The activity of a user does not affect his or her profile's ranking.
For some purposes, LinkedIn does take into account user activity, such as in deciding which users to market job postings to. However, this does not influence the activity of recruiters sending InMails; once a user applies for a job through LinkedIn, a recruiter can costlessly contact the user through e-mail or a phone call. Nevertheless, the description of the adjustment for user propensity to match a job posting is instructive. There are many predictors of job search, such as job posting clicks. One predictor of the propensity of a user to be a job seeker is time elapsed in current active job position. That is, a user is considered more likely to be a job seeker if she has a long tenure at the current job position. The LinkedIn job seeker measure appears to be calibrated based on this measure, according to Sorokina (2013) . This implies that the addition of a new job position will imply a low probability of being a job seeker. Thus, to the extent that mechanical effects operate through user activity in search the same way they operate in job posting advertising, it would cut against statistically observing an effect of InMails in response to job postings. Table 10 gives a broad overview of the U.S. labor market coverage of the LinkedIn user base.
2.c. LinkedIn User Base
LinkedIn's 10K does not report unique U.S. Visiting members; to derive the numbers we show, we use the proportion of Unique Visiting Members calculated from world figures and apply the ratio to the sum of U.S. registered users.
A 2015 Pew Research Center study found that the LinkedIn user base comprises 25 percent of all U.S. internet users. Most notably, high-income, college-educated, and non-rural internet users are over represented among this group. Around 25 percent of both male and female internet users are LinkedIn members, and a comparable proportion of whites, Hispanics, and blacks use the platform. Of course, the user base of the internet itself is not representative of the U.S. working population. In later sections, we describe the construction and composition of the specific data sample used in this paper. The sample overrepresents large states, educated workers, and the young. We eschew a re-weighting exercise, as it is unclear that such an exercise would truly make our estimates representative of the population, given our institutional context. Our results should thus be interpreted as average treatment effects over these particular demographic groups.
Sample Construction and Description
Our data sample consists of the LinkedIn users who were promoted within the individual-contributor seniority and those same users' monthly InMail counts for the two years surrounding the relevant promotion. In this section, we describe, in much greater detail, the steps of this sample construction and the reasoning behind it.
We begin with a random sample of all of LinkedIn's members. 8 First, we subset to only U.S. members. 9 We narrow our sample to those users with user identified job accessions. These are defined as events in which a user who has previously reported a position subsequently updates his or her profile with a new position. The accession is defined to be between the second most recent and most recent position updates. We consider only job accessions which start from April 2012 to September 2015 for which the user reported a month-year start date of the job. Promotions are not explicitly flagged in the data. Thus, to identify job accessions as promotion events, we require that the accession came at the same firm as the user's immediately previously reported job position.
To control the flow of information on user profiles in our study, we require that individuals report no new educational items from the month of their promotion job accession to the end of month of their promotion report (all such individuals who undertake such actions are dropped). 10 We require that each individual in the final data analysis undergo the promotion at an employer with at least 100 active LinkedIn users at the individual-contributor seniority at the time of our sample. This is intended to restrict the sample to traditional, comparable employers.
LinkedIn categorizes user positions as individual-contributors, managers, directors, vice presi-dents, and CEOs. We use the LinkedIn coding of seniorities for two reasons. First, their categorization is consistent with common job titles in the data based on a manual review of the most common job titles. Secondly, the recruiter interface allows search filtering based on these categorizations. In this paper, we focus on workers promoted within the individual-contributor seniority.
We only focus on within seniority movements since anecdotally the recruiting market for more elevated worker seniorities is very different. Thus, it would be difficult to compare employer interest before and after a promotion if this event coincides with the worker entering a new labor market with a different demand structure. In particular, this leads us to drop all instances of job to job movements with uncoded origin or destination seniority. Consistent with our intuition, in unreported results the main results of our paper hold in the data dropped for this reason, but the magnitudes are lower (as would be the case, for example if we pooled the baseline effects we estimate across individual-contributors and managers, for whom we find strong and nonexistent effects, respectively).
For job title classification, we rely on "standardized titles," which represent an internal effort by LinkedIn to create 24,000 standardized titles and map each user-specified title text to a standardized title. Unfortunately, there are still an intractably large amount of titles to parse manually. We take an agnostic approach, using the aforementioned filters to drop non-relevant observations. We believe that this approach is more transparent than anything that resembles the arbitrary handselection of titles to include in the sample. One critical exception is that we use regular expressions to identify any instances of the words "trainee," "intern," or "summer" in the standardized title bins, and drop any promotions if the job accession or the previous job was associated with such a title. Table 1 provides the 10 most common promotions between standardized job titles in our sample. Though the classification is not perfect, it appears the classification is for the most part sensible and in line with the types of promotions we are interested in studying; that is, workers promoted from one level of an occupation to the next within a company. We note that these titles are broad bins, so that a promotion from "Account Executive" to "Account Executive" may at the level of textual job titles be a promotion from "Account Executive" to "Account Executive,
Team Lead", for example. In general, most large companies (as described above, we restrict to those companies with more than 100 individual contributors observed in the sample) have multiple levels of seniority within a position such as Accountant, Software Engineer, and other common job categories observed in our data. To the degree that these movements are horizontal as opposed to vertical, they represent noise in the data that bias our study against finding results: we expect that horizontal movements would simply lead to InMail substitution -that is, a different set of recruiters would contact a user, with no net effect.
For each individual-event surviving these filters, we have data on InMails received in each of the 25 months around the reported start month of the promotion. Individuals must have 12 months of InMail history before the date of promotion to be included in the sample, which implicitly requires that their profiles exist for 12 months prior to the new job accession. This filters out in particular individuals whose profile creation occurs in the same month as our definition of a promotion report.
We use the terminology "event month zero" to describe the month of the start of the promotion, which is separate from calendar month (denoting the actual calendar month of events). Thus, our sample is a individual-promotion (individual-event) by 25 event month panel (from -12 to +12 event months).
Our final sample contains 339,378 individual-event-months, 14,640 individual-events, and 14,100 unique individuals. The individual-event-month panel is not fully balanced because for a promotion occurring very recently, we would not have InMail data on the full 12 months following the promotion event. 11
Aside from InMails, we are only able to measure observables at the time of the promotion. We note that while our measurement of InMails relies on administrative data and thus is reliable, our data on work histories are based on self-reported CVs. LinkedIn workers may not include their full work histories in their CVs (as noted in the press for example by Casselman (2016)). This measurement issue is an important caveat in interpreting our results.
[Insert Table 2 here]
In comparing the sample to existing data, we use the 2015 Current Population Survey (CPS), as it is likely that all workers reporting a promotion on LinkedIn in our sample period are still in the workforce as of the time of the 2015 CPS.
Geographic distribution of sample. We rely on a permanent measure of user location as of geographic distribution to that of employed workers in the 2015 CPS Local Area Unemployment Statistics. Table 9 contains the results of a cross-sectional regression run at the state level. Our sample appears indeed to over represent many populous states as the log-log coefficient is greater than one. These results are presented visually in Figures 4 and 5 in the Appendix.
Gender. LinkedIn does not require users to report gender; thus we report gender coding as done by an internal algorithm. In 2015, 53.28% of the over-20 employed population was male, according to the CPS. In our sample, males comprise approximately 56% of the gender coded promotions (individual-events); in the full pooled sample, males comprise 56.6% of unique individuals. Age. We do not directly observe age in our data. However, we can achieve a rough calculation if we assume that workers' first jobs begin at age 22, as likely is the case for the heavily college educated sample. The median years in workforce is 6, putting the median workers in our sample around age 28. By comparison, the median age among all workers 16 years and older in the 2015 CPS was 42.3 years of age. This is partially a result of the general LinkedIn population being skewed toward young people, although this is exacerbated by our choice to restrict to the individualcontributor to the exclusion of Managers, CEOs, Directors, and VP seniorities. Throughout, Years in Workforce is defined to be the floor function of the year of a user's first position start subtracted from the year of the promotion, and education is measured as of the time of promotion. Figure 4 gives the distribution of promotion report times across gender categories. Notably, the distribution of report times is remarkably similar across groups.
Promptness of Promotion Reports.
[Insert Table 4 here] InMails. Table 2 gives the distribution of InMails received at the individual-event-month level across gender categories; these data series are winsorized at the 99.9 percentile across all individualevent-months and then scaled by the sample standard deviation. These figures are averaged at the individual-event level to form the distribution InMails received at the individual-event level. Taken in either fashion, the distribution of InMails received has a heavy mass around zero.
To better understand the dependent variable of interest in this paper, we begin with an analysis of its cross sectional correlates in our dataset. We run simple linear regressions at the individualevent-time level, projecting InMails received on a variety of characteristics. We prefer this over an individual-event or individual cross section because this approach allows us to easily include a rich set of time varying fixed effects in the estimation. Standard errors are clustered at the individual and event time levels so that this procedure does not mechanically bias our standard errors to zero. Table 3 reports the results. We find an unconditional gender and college gap in our measure of labor demand: we find a 0.11σ gap in average InMails received between males and females, and a .16σ gap between those with a bachelors and without. Figure 1 displays this result graphically.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
To investigate the role of sorting in driving this variation, we incrementally introduce company, job position, and company-job position fixed effects into the estimation. The gender gap is partially explained by company sorting, and is entirely accounted for job sorting.
We emphasize that our results are not representative of the general U.S. labor force, as is clear from our comparison of our dataset to the population in the preceding section. The sample in general is a highly educated and skilled professional slice of the labor force. The results should in general be interpreted as holding for such workers. For example, the gender differential we document hold within highly educated workers in professional occupations. The educational differentials we document likely reflect differences between individuals holding identical positions with different rates of 4-year college completion, as may be the case for example among software engineers.
Do InMails Measure Labor Demand?
InMails are not a perfect measure of labor demand. The count of InMails received by a worker is an equilibrium quantity: given worker observables, firms form beliefs on both a worker's marginal productivity and salary demands, which jointly determine whether or not a recruiter sends a worker InMails in a given month. We of course cannot observe the full parameters of firms' labor demand functions. A good way to understand our dependent variable of interest, then, is as a panel data version of the recruiter contacts variable used in the long audit study literature, as in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) .
Empirical Approach
Our main analysis is focused on estimating the labor market signaling value of promotions, which we interpret to be evidence of asymmetric employer learning in line with the theory literature following Waldman (1984) . Our data enable us to identify the date of a user's job-post creation, as well as the month of the job start. This naturally motivates a differences in differences design in which we use the group of users who delay reporting a job as a counterfactual for users who report a new job immediately. We aggregate reporting times to the month level, since job-start dates are measured at this level.
We focus on promotions within the individual-contributor seniority to circumvent difficulties in interpreting cross-seniority movements arising from differences in recruiting practices and skill demand across seniorities. For example, one concern with the theoretical understanding of our results is the role that firm-specific human capital plays. If anything, the existence of firm-specific human capital would dilute our results, as external recruiters may understand promotions as signals on a worker's firm-specific human capital instead of generalizable ability. Our focus on individualcontributors, the lowest seniority bin, allows us to minimize these concerns with interpretation.
As previously discussed, we are unable to explicitly identify promotions in the data, either between or within companies. To operationalize the notion intuitively, we take all within-company consecutive job position movements to be promotions. While it is likely that some such job movements are lateral moves, to the degree that this is true it runs against our finding results as long as this type of error is uncorrelated with our treatment of interest, which is the timing of job reports. This may be violated, for example, if promotions are all reported immediately, and lateral moves are reported at a delay. This particular concern, however, appears inconsistent with the data: in Figure 2 it is apparent that "promotions" as identified by our metric are associated with increases in recruiter interest even when reported at lags up to three months.
4.a. Identification
The assignment of individuals into report time (month) bins is not random nor do we claim it to be. The identifying assumption underlying this research design is not random assignment of job-report delays; it is that recruiter interest in candidates would have trended similarly across different report time bins in the absence of any job reports. Specifically, in the main specification we take the treatment group to be users reporting at event month zero, and the control to be users reporting at event month one.
This identifying restriction is impossible to test directly, and is subject to possible endogeneity. Figure 2 , which displays the main results graphically, presents two initial pieces of evidence to alleviate this concern. Figure 2 displays the trend in InMails received per month six months prior to and after a promotion for users who report at time zero through four. First, we note that prior to promotion, recruiter interest follows parallel trends. This is reassuring, but because job reports are endogenously determined, we are still subject to omitted variables stories such as the concern that those who report a job early may have character traits which correlate with receiving higherquality and thus more strongly signaling promotions. However, Figure 2 also shows that across different report time bins, InMails trend similarly in response to a job report. This is consistent with the restriction that trends in recruiter interest are orthogonal to omitted variables determining job-report timing.
We note that in our baseline regression specifications, we compare only groups of promoted workers whose report times differ by one month; it is not likely that workers differ radically on such a small distinction. However, there may still be a concern that the report time groups differ on unobservables. Our results are robust to a rich set of fixed effects and a matching procedure, as discussed in the following section. Tables 5 presents results on the balance of control and treatment groups in the baseline and matched samples. As expected, in the baseline sample there may be a concern that those who report promotions immediately are systematically different from those who lag in reporting; one may be concerned for example that such workers simply receive better promotions, for example, invalidating the usefulness of the control group. The matched sample in contrast displays nearly even balance, and is a useful robustness check (alongside the inclusion of fixed effects) in alleviating such concerns.
4.b. Regression Specification
We write the baseline ordinary least squares differences-in-differences specification as follows.
Here t indexes calendar month, τ indexes event month (normalized to zero for the start-month of a job), and i indexes an individual-event. To check the robustness and interpretation of the results, we include a rich set of fixed effects; in particular, we include combinations of calendar month, individual-event, company-event month, and destination job-event month effects. We opt to include promotion destination job fixed effects as we are most concerned about the omitted variables story in which workers promoted to better jobs report faster than other workers; the results are unchanged if we use origin job × event time effects. Our dataset provides only individual-event specific controls; we omit these as they are absorbed by the individual-event fixed effects.
The treatment in this study is the time of reporting of an individual falls into, which varies at the individual-event level. Standard errors clustered at this level account for possible correlation within an individual-event and absorbs concerns on misleading standard errors due to the panel dimension. For extra precaution, we cluster standard errors at the individual level (there are individuals who appear more than once in the sample, although this population is small and the results are unchanged if they are omitted).
The Labor Market Signaling Value of Promotions: Results and

Discussion
Columns 1-4 of Table 6 display the baseline OLS results. Here τ ∈ [−4, 0] and 1{After} τ turns on if and only if τ = 0. That is, the pre-treatment data runs from one month to four months prior to a promotion, and the treatment sample is only the month of the promotion. Visually, this estimation corresponds to the lower left panel of Figure 2 . In our baseline specification (1), we find that that the average causal effect of a user-reported promotion during the first month is is 0.20 times the mean and .079 times the standard deviation of the individual-event-month distribution of InMails received. Relative to the results in Table 3 , a back of the envelope calculation suggests that this average promotion signaling effect is 2 times the within company gender gap in labor demand, and 0.65 times the within company college gap.
We subject the raw differences in differences specification to a progression of fixed effects, as described in the previous section. We include individual-promotion and calendar month fixed effects in all specifications, although the results are robust in magnitude and statistical significance to no fixed effects. These results rule out explanations for the results in which certain companies or occupations receive high recruiter interest and also systematically report sooner than other companies or occupations.
[Insert Table 6 here]
Matching Procedure. While we have argued that the baseline treatment and control group display similar pre-trends, the top panel of Table 5 demonstrates that these groups are not well balanced. To mitigate these concerns, we adopt a simple and parsimonious matching approach.
We use nearest-neighbor matching with logit-estimated propensity scores and matching on years in workforce at time of the job accession, average count of InMails during event months -12 to -7, college educational attainment, count of active individual-contributor users at the worker's company on LinkedIn, and gender (we restrict to gender-coded users). The treatment group is those who report a promotion immediately, and we draw potential matches from the full residual of users in our sample (that is, those who report at any delay up to one year). For a match, we require that user propensity scores be within 0.01 standard deviation of each other. The bottom panel of Table   5 demonstrates that the resulting treatment and control group are well balanced.
Not all gender-coded individual-events in the τ = 0 group find a τ ≥ 1 match due to our propensity score closeness restriction. For the matching analysis, we simply retain matched individualevents and their matches, and run the same regression analysis. The top panel of Figure 3 displays the results graphically, and the results are displayed in columns 5-8 of Table 2 . The results in magnitude are robust to matching, though specification (8) The results indicate that the average LinkedIn-reported promotion within the individual-contributor seniority increases a worker's perceived labor market value. Importantly, the estimation pools all promotions together, and thus the results have the interpretation of an average signaling effect across all promotions in the sample.
Lastly, we note that we cannot rule out that the effect operates through the search algorithm in the sense that there may be new key-words in a new job report which better match recruiter queries.
However, to the extent that this is true, in market equilibrium recruiters will understand this effect and internalize it, using higher profile placement to determine better match to their query. This is consistent with an informational frictions interpretation. It is reasonable to expect that such an equilibrium to obtain since recruiting on LinkedIn is itself a competitive activity undertaken by recruiters incentivized to optimize their behavior.
5.a. Prior Recruiter Interest and Promotion Signaling
In Table 7 , we investigate the heterogeneity of the signaling effect of promotions. Approximately half the sample (51.4%) receives zero InMails from 12 to 7 months prior to the promotion, so we take this as a natural dividing line along which to separate the sample into subsets of individual-events with "high" and "low" prior recruiter interest.
The results, as visualized in the lower two panels of Figure 3 , demonstrate that users who have attracted recent recruiter interest drive the signaling effect. In the baseline specifications from Table 7 it is clear that the signaling effect of promotions is heavily concentrated in the subset of the sample with prior recruiter interest. This could be interpreted without further checks as evidence that idiosyncratic qualities of individuals which attract high recruiter interest in turn prompt higher visibility for signaling subsequent promotions. However, the inclusion of job and company by time fixed effects weaken the precision of the effect, and columns (4) and (8) with the saturated specification provide a strong case that the job and company by time effects absorb the heterogeneity of the effect by prior recruiter interest. This suggests that the heterogeneity of the signaling effect is not driven by idiosyncratic qualities of individuals, such as linked personal websites or career statements, and instead by a user's initial quality of firm and occupation.
5.b. The Role of the Search Ranking Algorithm
One concern with our preferred interpretation of the results is that they are driven by a mechanical effect in which recent profile activity drives the LinkedIn search algorithm to prioritize a profile, in which case an informational frictions interpretation would be less relevant. Direct evidence from conversations with LinkedIn employees familiar with the recruiter search algorithm cuts against this interpretation in the sense that the act of updating a profile in the fashion this paper focuses on does not lead to a mechanical effect on InMails received or recruiter profile views. This is based on conversations with employees with knowledge of how the search algorithm worked during the sample period, as well as publicly available documentation (see Section 2 for a detailed discussion of the algorithm).
Another flavor of concern on a mechanical effect is that users may be attempting to "spam" the LinkedIn search algorithm (see Sorokina (2013) ) by adding duplicates of job positions. We note two reasons why this is not a major concern for the results. First, LinkedIn understands and actively acts to mitigate this issue, as in Sorokina (2013) . Secondly, our dependent variable is not profile clicks, but InMails sent. It is doubtful that recruiters, upon viewing a "spam" filled profile, would be motivated to use a costly InMail on such a user.
5.c. Job Search Intensity as an Omitted Variable
A concern with identification restriction is that those who report a promotion immediately are searching for jobs more intensely than those who delay a promotion report one month. This could affect the interpretation of the results in that the equilibrium understanding in the market is that early promotion report signal a willingness to leave a company, instead of high worker ability. To address this concern, first we note that while this may be true at longer latencies (i.e. immediate report versus five years), our prior is that a one-month delay in a promotion report would not be enough margin to lead to a systematic difference in job search activity. Secondly, as discussed above and in Section 2, we find it unlikely that job search activity would mechanically drive the effect based on our understanding of LinkedIn algorithms.
Lastly, while we cannot fully rule it out, we find no support in the data for an interpretation in which workers who post jobs signal that they are searching for jobs actively. In Table 8 we restrict the baseline sample to those individual-events for whom at least one year has elapsed since the promotion event, and test whether job change outcomes systematically differ between those reporting a promotion immediately or with a one month delay. We find no systematic differences in statistical significance, but more importantly the magnitudes are insubstantial. For example, columns (5) and (6) of Table 8 imply that those who immediately report a promotion on average are 1.2% more likely to change companies in the subsequent year, and conditional on a change occurring, change companies 8.5% days faster. This is inconsistent with the results being identified off systematic differences in job search intensity. Ideally, we would be able to directly control for job-search activities on LinkedIn, but unfortunately we are unable to do so given the scope of data we have access to for this project.
[Insert Table 8 here]
5.d. Negative Binomial Estimation
The dependent variable of interest in this study, the count of InMails received from recruiters in a given month, is a count variable with a large number of zeros. To ensure that this does not confound the results, we use a negative binomial strategy to account for possible resulting nonlinearity of the conditional mean in this variable, as is standard in the literature when working with count-data as a dependent variable.
Inclusion of fixed effects is problematic in a negative binomial model; thus help control for individual-event unobserved heterogeneity, we include among the controls the average of InMails received from event time -12 to -7. The specification is as follows: Table 12 in the Appendix reports the results, which are consistent in magnitude with the OLS estimation in the baseline results.
Conclusion
This paper studies external firm learning in a novel empirical setting, LinkedIn, which is conducive to direct study of informational dynamics in labor markets. We demonstrate a causal effect of promotion reports on external firm interest, and show that this effect is concentrated among users who recently had attracted recruiter interest. Our work is broadly consistent with the prior literature on asymmetric information in the labor market in that they imply that firm learning on workers is asymmetric; that is, firms learn more easily about workers within their own firm boundaries than other workers. We are able to show further that the visibility or weight given to promotions for signaling purposes varies strongly by initial firm and job position, and is less driven by idiosyncratic individual characteristics. This figure plots average InMails received for report-time bins six months prior to and after a promotion, which occurs at Event Month Zero on the x-axis. The sample is the baseline sample, and corresponds to the regression specifications in Table 6 column (1)-(4). As described in the paper, we scale InMail counts by the sample standard deviation. This figure plots average InMails received for report-time bins six months prior to and after a promotion, which occurs at Event Month Zero on the x-axis. The sample is the matched sample, and corresponds to the regression specifications in Table 6 columns (5)- (8). See Section 4 for details of the matching procedure. The lower-right panel displays trends for individual-events with zero InMails received from -12 to -7 months relative to the promotion date, the the lower-left panel displays the residual subset. As described in the paper, we use InMails scaled by the sample standard deviation for privacy reasons. This table provides the 10 most common promotions between standardized job titles in our sample. We note that these titles are broad bins, as exact seniority levels vary across companies. Thus, a promotion from "Account Executive" to "Account Executive" may at the level of textual job titles be a promotion from "Account Executive"
to "Account Executive, Team Lead", for example. Calculations are taken at the member-month level on the underlying data in the regressions of Table 6 . "Full" sample denotes no missing observations (some member-promotions do not have a gender code in the baseline sample). Note: Standard errors clustered at the individual level.All specifications include individual-promotion and calendar-month fixed effects. Matching is done as specified in Section 4. Full triple differences specifications are estimated but partial effects are omitted here for brevity. Job fixed effects refer to the job a user is promoted to (as opposed to promoted from). * p < 0.05, * * p < 0.01, * * * p < 0.001 
